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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
SALT LAKE CITY, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
CRAIG NORMAN HENDRICKS, 
Defendant / Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
Case No. 20001006-CA 
Priority No. 2 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This matter is an appeal from a judgment and conviction for domestic violence 
battery, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of § 11.08.020 of the Salt Lake City Code. 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§78-2a-3(2)(e)(1996). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Issue for Review. 
1. Did the trial judge commit error by instructing the jury regarding defense of 
habitation on behalf of the victim to assist the jury in understanding the appellant's claim 
of self-defense? 
Standard of Review. 
The propriety of a jury instruction is reviewed for correctness. State v. Brooks, 
833 P.2d 362 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
RELEVANT CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Salt Lake City Code § 11.08.020 states: 
A battery is any willful and unlawful use of force or violence upon the person of 
another. It is unlawful for any person to commit a battery within the limits of the city. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The appellant was charged by way of Information with having committed the 
offenses of domestic violence battery and disturbing the peace on or about September 9, 
2000, in Salt Lake City. Following arraignment and a pre-trial conference, the matter was 
set for a jury trial. Trial before a jury was held on October 25, 2000, the Honorable Ann 
Boyden, Judge, presiding. Appellant was convicted of the domestic violence battery 
count and was sentenced that day. Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal to this court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Lowell Hendricks rented a house at 953 South Denver Street in Salt Lake City. As 
permitted under his lease, he allowed his brother Craig, the appellant herein, to live with 
him as a permissive at-will guest with the understanding that Craig would give Lowell 
some money to help with rent and utilities. (TR. 76 at 7, 8). On July 23, 2000, Lowell 
and Craig had an argument and Lowell asked Craig to move out of the house. (TR. 76 at 
6, 104). Craig voluntarily moved out of the house, quitting the premises, arranged 
lodgings elsewhere, and discussed with Lowell and their father having their father assist 
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with removal of Craig's belongings. (TR. 76 at 8, 10, 98, 103, 105). An arrangement 
was worked out that the father would be present and assist in the removal of Craig's 
belongings. (TR. 76 at 10, 98, 99). 
On September 8, 2000, Craig went to Lowell's house and slept in the utility room 
adjoining the kitchen. (TR. 76 at 7, 102). However, the kitchen door was locked and 
Craig could not enter the main part of the house. This was the first time since July 23, 
2000, that Craig had returned to the house or stayed there for any period of time. On 
September 9, 2000, Lowell returned home at about 8:00 o'clock in the evening and saw 
Craig working on his broken-down truck at the rear of the house. (TR. 76 at 9, 99-102). 
Lowell walked a few steps down the driveway and said something to Craig about being at 
the house. (TR. 76 at 13). Lowell then walked back up to the front of the house entered 
the front door and locked it. Craig continued tinkering with his truck and later wandered 
around the neighborhood and went to the park. Sometime around 11:00 P.M. that 
evening Craig returned to Lowell's house. (TR. 76 at 13, 107). 
The testimony of Lowell and Craig regarding what happened after Craig returned 
to Lowell's house is in conflict. In a nutshell, here are the two versions starting with 
Lowell's version and then Craig's version. 
Lowell testified that he heard a noise at the kitchen door and went to investigate. 
He saw Craig entering the house from the utility room and while apparently walking 
toward Craig told him "Get out, you're not living here." He may have also tried in some 
way to stop Craig from entering the house. Craig stated "Oh, yeah, I'm moving back in," 
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to which Lowell responded "No, you're not." According to Lowell, Craig then struck 
him in the eye area. Lowell fell to the floor and began crawling toward the front door. 
As Lowell was crawling across the floor, Craig kicked Lowell numerous times across the 
floor toward the front door. After kicking Lowell across the floor, Craig unlocked the 
front door and shoved, kicked or threw Lowell's carcass out onto the front porch. Lowell 
managed to get to a neighbor's and call police. (TR. 76 at 14-20). 
Craig testified that upon his return to the house he went to the front door and put a 
camera that was in his pocket in the mailbox to retrieve later. Craig stated that upon his 
knocking, Lowell let him in the house through the front door. Craig stated that they 
spoke for a short while and that Lowell began talking to him in a suggestive and offensive 
way. Craig stated that Lowell then put his arm around him and began to make 
homosexual advances, eventually fondling or squeezing his groin area. Craig stated that 
he attempted to leave when Lowell caught him in a massive bear hug from behind. Craig 
struggled to free himself from Lowell's grip and finally had to bite Lowell on the arm to 
break Lowell's grip. Craig then managed to push Lowell off him, but in doing so Lowell 
stumbled back toward the kitchen/bedroom areas of the house. Craig feared Lowell 
might obtain a weapon, like a knife or axe, from one of the other rooms and rather than 
fumble with the double locks on the front door and escape, Craig decided to punch 
Lowell in the eye a couple of times. Lowell dropped to the floor from the punches and 
Craig then pushed and kicked Lowell across the floor toward the front door. With Lowell 
"paralyzed," Craig was able to unlock the door and kick Lowell out onto the front porch. 
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Craig then closed and locked the front door. Craig remained inside the house until police 
arrived. (TR. 76 at 90-119). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The jury was presented with two diametrically opposed versions of the relevant 
events that took place between Lowell and Craig Hendricks on September 9, 2000. In 
determining credibility, the jury would determine whether self-defense was available to 
Craig under the version of facts it accepted. By accepting Lowell's version of events, the 
jury determined, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Craig did not factually have self-defense 
available, regardless of whether it determined that Lowell had defense of habitation 
available. If the jury accepted Lowell's version of events, as it obviously did, then the 
defense of habitation only explained the factual basis of Lowell's confrontation of Craig 
at the door of the kitchen and possible attempt to stop Craig from entering the house. The 
instruction would not operate to abrogate Craig's claim of self-defense except to the 
extent that the jury could reasonably determine that Craig was the initial aggressor or that 
his use of force exceeded that degree of force necessary for self-defense to apply. In 
either event, the jury could, and obviously did, determine that, under the accepted facts, 
Craig did not have self-defense available. Because the jury could easily determine that 
engaging in "fighting, violent, tumultuous or threatening behavior" as charged in the 
disturbing the peace count could or should be included in any finding of guilt on the 
battery count, it is not unusual for the jury to convict of battery and acquit on disturbing 




The Instructions Regarding Self-Defense and Defense of Habitation 
Are Either Complimentary To or Independent of Each Other 
as Applied to Each of the Two Versions of Events, 
This case is not one in which the instructions were difficult to apply or where the 
instructions were confusing, misleading or contradictory. Rather, this case is one of 
credibility. If the jury accepted Lowell's version of events from the time Craig entered 
the house, then the defense of habitation instruction may apply to justify Lowell's 
confrontation of Craig at the door in the kitchen. But under Lowell's version of events, 
Craig would have no factual basis to claim self-defense. On the other hand, if the jury 
accepted Craig's version of events from the time Craig entered the house, then Lowell 
would have no factual basis to claim defense of habitation and Craig would have the 
defense of self-defense available. What is clear from the jury's verdict is that they 
believed Lowell and did not believe Craig. The instructions are exclusive to the different 
versions of events, and neither was applicable under the other's version. Therefore, what 
the jury did was to state by its verdict that it believed Lowell and that while Lowell may 
have had defense of habitation available, Craig certainly did not have self-defense 
available under the facts accepted by the jury. 
As the Utah Supreme Court has reiterated over the years, "The purpose of giving 
instructions to the jurors is to assist them in understanding issues which they have to 
decide in the case." State v. Carter, 888 P.2d 629 (Utah 1994), cert, denied, 516 U.S. 858 
6 
(1995); State v. James, 819 P.2d 781, 798-799 (Utah 1991); State v. Potter, 627 P.2d 75, 
78 (Utah 1981). In this case the two opposed versions of events required the jury to 
decide the issues of credibility and self-defense. The instruction regarding use of force in 
defense of habitation was not presented, in the context of the instructions as a whole, as 
an affirmative defense, since Lowell was not on trial, but rather, in the context of 
assisting the jury in understanding the claim of self-defense made by Craig. That use of 
the instruction was disclosed to the trial judge in the discussion concerning inclusion of 
the instruction. (TR. 76 at 46-47). 
POINT II. 
The Defense of Habitation Instruction Did Not Create a 
Mandatory Rebuttable Presumption And Did Not 
Shift the Burden of Proof. 
It is a given that in a criminal case the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt every fact necessary to constitute the crime charged. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 
(1970). Based upon the presentation of some facts warranting such an instruction, in a 
trial alleging assault or battery the defendant may request an instruction regarding self-
defense to address whether the use of force by defendant was justified. That is, whether 
the use of force by defendant was unlawful. Such an instruction was requested and given 
in the present matter. However, mere incantation of the term "self-defense" doesn't sell 
the issue to the jury. There are still a number of factors the jury must weigh from all of 
the evidence to determine whether the defendant's use of force was justified and 
constituted self-defense. For example, the defendant can't claim self-defense if he was 
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the initial aggressor, nor can the defendant use force excessive to that required to defend 
himself from the other's actual or imminent use of force. U.C.A § 76-2-402. As stated 
by the Utah Supreme Court in State v. Storks, 627 P.2d 88 (Utah 1981), "one who 
willingly and knowingly provokes a combat may be an aggressor, and if one who initially 
was a non-aggressor escalates a fight beyond a level wliich would be justified in view of 
the nature of the original provocation, then he loses the right to claim the defense of self-
defense." Id at 90. 
The context of the instructions must be taken into consideration. An instruction 
complained of must be read in light of its immediate context and the context of all of the 
instructions as a whole. State v. Smith, 726 P.2d 1232 (Utah 1986). In the present 
matter, it is clear that the defense of habitation instruction was not given as an instruction 
of an affirmative defense. Rather, it was given solely to assist the jury in understanding 
the self-defense claim being made by Craig. If the jury believed the version of events as 
related by Craig, then there was no factual basis for the defense of habitation instruction, 
and its inclusion would be at most harmless error. If, however, the jury believed the 
version of events as related by Lowell, then Lowell's actions in aggressively approaching 
Craig as he entered the house, telling him to get out and perhaps attempting to stop Craig 
from entering the house should be evaluated as part of Craig's self-defense claim with the 
use of the defense of habitation instruction to assist the jury in understanding and 
determining the self-defense issue. 
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A mandatory rebuttable presumption is a device that operates to relieve the 
prosecution of the affirmative burden of persuasion on a presumed element by instructing 
the jury that it must find the presumed element unless the defendant persuades the jury 
not to make such a finding. State v. Chambers, 709 P.2d 321 (Utah 1985). With regard 
to the defense of habitation instruction, the jury was not instructed regarding any 
presumption with regard to the defendant. Rather, the jury was instructed that if they 
found that Craig's entry was unlawful and was made with force, then Lowell would have 
a right to use reasonable force—which under Craig's version of events didn't happen 
anyway—to prevent Craig's entry; and further, if the jury made those findings then 
Lowell's use of force would be presumed to be reasonable. However, although Lowell 
testified that he was approaching Craig telling to get out and may have tried to stop Craig 
from entering the house, there was no testimony from either Lowell or Craig that Lowell 
actually used force to prevent Craig's entry. Therefore, there was no presumption 
regarding the defendant—Craig—in the instruction. Since there was no presumption 
regarding the defendant or his conduct in the instruction, there could be no shifting of the 
burden of proof. All of the instructions taken in context as a whole clearly instruct the 
jury that the burden of proof was right where it should be—on the prosecution. "In 
criminal cases, the ultimate test of any [evidentiary] device's constitutional validity in a 
given case remains constant: the device must not undermine the fact-finder's 
responsibility at trial, based on evidence adduced by the State, to find the ultimate facts 
beyond a reasonable doubt." County Court of Ulster County v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 156 
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(1979); Chambers, 709 P.2d at 325. Use of the defense of habitation instruction did not 
undermine the fact-finder's responsibility in the present matter. Rather, use of the 
instruction, taken together with all of the other instructions regarding self-defense, 
assisted the jury in its determination of the self-defense issue. I can understand 
appellant's disagreement with the jury's finding. 
POINT III 
At the Time of the Incident, Lowell did Have the Right to Deny 
Appellant Entry into the Premises. 
Lowell was the leaseholder for the premises. He allowed Craig to live there as a 
permissive guest provided Craig paid something toward the rent and utilities. There was 
never any written rental agreement between the two. (TR. 76 at 7-8). Following the 
disagreement between the brothers in July, Lowell asked Craig to move out. Craig 
willingly and voluntarily moved out of the premises, thereby quitting or abandoning the 
premises. (TR. 76 at 8, 86, 104-105). As pointed in the statement of facts, including 
references to Craig's own testimony, he knew that he could not simply go over to 
Lowell's house to retrieve any remaining property. He knew that he had to coordinate 
with their father to be present in accordance with their agreement. 
Contrary to appellant's assertion in his brief, there simply isn't enough evidence in 
the record to establish that Craig was a tenant of Lowell's or that there was a landlord 
tenant relationship between the two. Even if there was such a relationship, Craig's 
abandonment or quitting of the premises would allow Lowell to exclude Craig from the 
premises under U.C.A. § 78-36-12. Lastly, Craig knew that he had no right to enter 
10 
Lowell's house. When asked if he entered the house on September 8, 2000 before Lowell 
returned home, Craig said "No because, I have to get a hold of him." (TR. 76 at 89). 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, the plaintiff respectfully requests that the trial court's 
inclusion of the defense of habitation instmction be upheld, and that the verdict of the 
jury finding the appellant guilty of battery be AFFIRMED. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED t h i s f V ^ d a y of August, 2001. 
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